The Myths of Accessibility and Equity in California Higher Education

Contrary to popular opinion, public higher education in CA is accessible.  Despite all the funds available to address issues of equity, the fact remains that between the 113 community colleges and 23 CSU schools, just about anyone can get into college and have opportunity to pursue an undergraduate degree.  The system that has some issues with accessibility is the UC system.

With the recent audit coming out showing that as little 16% of CA residents were being admitted to UCLA as freshmen, it raises the question of what the role of UCs are in public education.  While they are autonomous in how they operate, the UCLAs and UC Berkeleys of the world present a bit of a false hope to the average student in CA.  Unless a student is a valedictorian with straight As there is very little to no chance of gaining admission.



The role of the CA Master Plan must be challenged.  It seems to merely maintain a pecking order limiting the access and roles of community colleges and CSU schools.  Community colleges are trying to confer baccalaureate degrees and we have already seen the political pushback limiting BA/BS to only 15 campuses.  Also within the CSU system, you see there are no professional schools or Ph.D programs (Some schools confer Ed.D and DPT degrees).  The Master plan puts the aforementioned schools in their place. UC is king and everyone else is just happy to be able to play.

When are CSU leaders going to challenge the system?  How hard would it be for Fresno State to form an alliance with San Joaquin College of Law to house a law school or for CSU Bakersfield to team up with Kern Medical Center to make it a teaching center for future doctors (KMC already has an agreement with Ross University School of Medicine)?  The limitations are the Master Plan, which is a guideline, and the mentality of the current leadership in CA higher ed.  Unfortunately, this limits access to professional schools in the Central Valley and it also limits intellectual capacity in those regions.

Year after year, Central Valley cities such as Visalia, Fresno, Bakersfield, and Salinas are christened the lease educated cities in America.  I would argue this is by the historical design of the Central Valley being designed to house oil and agriculture.  There has been little incentive to innovate or grow outside of this comfortable box which guarantees poverty and dependence for generations.  By building professional schools, they would encourage intellectuals to move to the region as well as it would retain local students seeking a career in those fields.

Some CSU leader is going to have to have the proverbial balls to be brash and daring.  The plight of the valley can not change without change agents.  It needs people to think strategically and systematically make changes that encourage intellect, thought, and, more importantly, build capacity in the Central Valley of California.

NCAA Misconduct

Problems are manifested in NCAA violations and misconduct.  Lack of oversight is the structural deficiency.  It is steeped in the misguided belief that just placing good people in the right positions will ensure compliance.  Good people are human.  A structure can be a rigid a flexible as leaders want it to be.  A structure can mitigate human error and save the individual from bad decisions that would effectively hurt the organization.

 Humphreys and Ruseski (2009) conclude in a study that elite private schools, service academies, and schools from low profile conferences were least likely to cheat.  The study also concludes that penalties of “usual suspects” were lessened by self-reporting. 

Mark P. Pritchard and Rick Burton (2014) research factors that motivate compliance in.  Deontological ethics maintain that moral standards about the right or wrong of an action depend on its intrinsic qualities, not on the nature of its consequences.  DE is intrinsic motivation.  Teleological ethics is a case of the ends justifying the means.  Essentially, external factors can be the impetus of motivation.  In terms of compliance, these theoretical principles can help to understand what ensures compliance within an athletic program. “Some studies observe that relying on rewards and punishments, ‘sticks and carrots’, for ethical conduct ends up leading employees to operate at Kohlberg’s lowest level of moral reasoning.” (Pritchard & Burton, 2014, p. 94) suggesting that individuals obey rules for fear of the consequences (as opposed to deviating from an internal moral compass).  

College Athletics and the Power of Brand Logic

The 2nd assumption of structural framing is that organizations increase efficiency and enhance performance through specialization and appropriate division of labor (Bolman & Deal, 2008, p. 47).  To “enhance performance” or, in this case, ensure compliance, there needs to be personnel solely dedicated to enforcing and overseeing standards.  

They must also fall outside of organizational control of the athletic department (i.e. appropriate division of labor).  The outside control speaks to the necessary inherent distrust.  There are several anecdotal cases that support the need for checks and balances.  There are academic institutions, such as Southern Methodist University in the 1980s that could not control its football program and was habitually afoul of NCAA compliance.  On the other hand, there were relatively clean programs.  There were programs that prided themselves on the simple that their student athletes graduated and did things the right way.  Sometimes, the semblance of compliance is in stark contrast to reality.  This was Penn State University.

Penn State was a beacon in college athletics due to the fact it incurred no sanctions or major violations.  It was one of the few Division I programs to have this distinction.  Unfortunately, the symbolism did not reflect reality.  Jerry Sandusky, an assistant coach, was using the pristine image of the athletic program to partake in misconduct on a criminal level.  Sandusky was molesting and sexually assaulting children on the Penn State campus.  Not only did Sandusky have carte blanche to utilize the campus and its facilities for ill will, Joe Paterno, the head coach, and senior leadership at State College had knowledge of this misconduct and failed to act on it (which was the NCAA infraction). 

Paterno, a coach of over 46 years, did great things for college athletics as a whole.  A great program, that he helped build, displace too much trust in one person (several people, actually).  There was not enough appropriate oversight to address unethical behavior and misconduct.  The overseers had a vested interest in not divulging information contrary to the image that was Penn State athletics.

Proffitt and Corrigan (2012), question “brand logic” that seems to have taken precedence over compliance in college athletics.  They contend that the desire for Penn State University to maintain its pristine persona facilitated Sandusky’s egregious behavior of sexually abusing children to continue with impunity.  “What needs further interrogation, though, is not the consequences of the tragedy for this brand and the athletic-educational institution for which it stands, but the extent to which a ‘brand logic’ contributed to or shaped university officials decisions” (2012, p. 322) Leadership at the highest levels had knowledge of impropriety (an assistant coach witnessed misconduct and notified them) yet did nothing to address it.  In conjunction with ethics and professionalism, it can be argued that the Penn State leadership also had a fiduciary duty to protect children on its campus.

Proffitt’s and Corrigan’s focus is not necessarily on individuals, per se, but on “corporatized” (i.e. structural) motivations.  “The football teams $72.7 million in 2010 revenue is but one indicator of the brand’s value to the university” (2012, p. 323) The lack of focus on the leadership (or lack thereof) at the highest levels is not to justify their actions but critique the convenient structure in collegiate athletics that make it easier to unethical choices. “The pressures  facing intercollegiate athletics---be self-supporting, win, and reflect well on the university---mean that university and athletics administrators constantly have to take brand logic into their decision-making” (2012, p. 323)

Proffitt and Corrigan (2012) raised some interesting points regarding the need for schools to be self-supporting.  Only 20-30 athletic programs generate enough revenue to cover annual expenses.  Penn State is one of the few schools to operate at a sustainable level without relying on the school’s general fund or student fees generating revenues of $106.6 million and expenditures of $88 million.  But the fact that so few schools are self-sustaining speaks to the need to feed the proverbial beast.  The need to seek more revenue may lend to brand logic being the driver of decisions.  It would not be in the interest of Penn State to hurt the branding of “JoePa Mugs” and Nittany Lion sweaters.  Penn State ranked in the top ten schools in royalties and from merchandise by Collegiate Licensing Company (Proffitt & Corrigan, 2012).  It is fair to assume that protecting the brand was in Penn State’s interest.  In fact, the university hired Ketchum, a global public relations firm, to protect its brand.  Quinnipiac University president opines, “If a faculty member with a child had done that same thing, or a dean or a vice president or president, I don’t think it would have been a close call that it would have been turned over to the police and be handled as a criminal manner”.  The structure of Penn State allowed the pressures of profit and prestige to supersede compliance.

The NCAA, Amorality, and the Disincentivization of College Athletics

Randy R. Grant, John C. Leadley, and Zenon X. Zygmont (2013) hold a position along the lines of Piquero (2012) but from a coaches’ perspective.  They are concluding that with coaches’ salaries being so great, the incentive is there for them to cheat.  Nick Saban, University of Alabama football head coach, is the highest paid coach at $5.2 million.  The average salary for a Division I football head coach is $1.36 million (2013, p. 61).

Academic goals are not incentivized on the same scale as winning.  For example, University of Oklahoma football coach Bob Stoops receives a bonus of $10,000 for a 70% graduation rate but receives $150,000 for winning the national championship (Grant et al., 2013, p.63).  The priorities seem pretty clear when quantified in dollars and cents.  “Rhetoric about academic goals does not hold up to close scrutiny.” (Grant et al., 2013, p. 63)  Tyrone Willingham, a well-liked coach at Notre Dame that received praise from his boss, Athletic Director Kevin White, for running a clean program but was subsequently fired for lack of wins (overall record of 19-12).  White states that, “from Sunday through Friday our football program has exceeded all expectations, in every way.  We have not madethe progress on the field that we need to make.”  

College Athletic Programs and Social Deviancy

How does an Athletic Director create a compliant and ethical athletic program?  From a framing perspective (Bolman & Deal, 2008) it will enable different methods in which to come up with a solution.  Is compliance an issue due to people or is it the organization (human resource vs. structural framing)?  Perhaps it’s an issue of culture and values or institutional/personal agendas (symbolic vs political framing).   From framing perspectives, there are various solutions on how to address the issue of compliance.  Brad Humphreys (2009) views the answer to compliance as a human resource framed solution.  Proffitt and Corrigan (2012) allude to inadequate structural framing as a reason that programs are violate National College Athletic Association (NCAA) bylaws.

In Organizational Theory, human resource framing would view the answer to compliance as people driven.  An athletic program would have the right athletic director, coaches, staff, and student-athletes to ensure no violations occur at the institution.  In NCAA Rule Infractions, Humphreys makes the argument that student athletes are no more deviant than general society (2012).  He surmises that the answer to ensuring a compliant program would be to find student-athletes that value amateurism.  Humphreys (2009) doesn’t view student-athletes as the problem as much as he does the self-interested and capricious nature of the NCAA.  “The NCAA has clear and strong economic interests in maintaining the existing cartel agreement and its exemption from labor and antitrust law”. (2012, p. 711)  There is a structural frame response to Humphreys’ critique of the NCAA, however.  He does not view coaches and student athletes as “bad” as much as he sees the rules (i.e. the structure) as arcane and self-serving.  There is a rule enforcement disconnect “that punishes a 21-year-old for accepting a free drink in a local bar” juxtaposed to coaches earning salaries in excess of $4million (2012, p. 711)

Piquero (2012) hypothesizes that due to the current temptations (i.e. access) student-athletes face, infractions would be inevitable.  Structural framing would have to address an assumption that student athletes face more temptation than average “non-college athletes”.  Again, Piquero (2012) is critical of the rules that govern compliance yet not as much on student-athletes violating rules.  The life of student-athletes is so unique.  “Student-athletes live in two college contexts, one organized around the traditional college experience and a unique one organized around athletics.”(p. 715) Piquero argues that opportunity for deviancy is actually higher for athletes yet they offend on levels similar to traditional students.  A 2011 Sports Illustrated investigation conducted on every player on opening day rosters of the preseason 2010 top 25 showed that 7% of players had a criminal record (Piquero, 2012, p. 715).  Piquero argues that by being held to a higher standard, it creates an artificially higher standard of deviance in student-athletes.

What is considered deviant is a much higher level of scrutiny than typical delinquent behavior of traditional students.  Not only do laws and student code of conducts apply but so do NCAA bylaws.  “If a non-student athlete would receive a free meal or t-shirt, then it would unlikely be illegal, but it if a student-athlete received a free meal or free t-shirt during the course (or as a result of) their occupational status, then it would likely be considered an NCAA violation” (Piquero, 2012, 715).  This does not excuse student-athletes of committing infractions but, rather, gives the reader better insight into the rules and that “deviancy” doesn’t necessarily equate to a bad or untrustworthy person.  There is context to compliance in collegiate athletics that must be considered.

To better clarify his position, Piquero (2012) makes parallels of NCAA infractions to corporate/organizational crime.  “Researchers have routinely found that although microlevel factors are important for understanding corporate offending, so too are macrolevel factors as well as general cultural influences that specific to the pressures and realities of the business world” (2012, p. 715)  He asserts that violations are only made possible by the fact that these student-athletes have an exclusive type of access.  Would a traditional student of modest means at USC have access to front row tickets to an NBA playoff game as OJ Mayo? (Katz, 2008)  Student-athletes have exclusive access in the context of their celebrity.

Piquero’s solutions to ensuring compliance are unrealistic.  He calls it the “two-prong policy”.  “The prevention of student-athlete misconduct needs to start as early in the life course as possible, largely because athletes need to be socialized in fair and ethical conduct and behavior.”(p. 719) He believes that receipt of goods for performance should not be the prize but wins and stats are the philosophical reward of “doing one’s job”.  Secondly, upon enrollment into college, student-athletes should be taught and assimilated into an ethical athletic culture.  “They should be tested early and often about NCAA rules, so that they are absolutely clear in what they are permitted to do and what they cannot do.”(2012, p. 719)  This is a symbolic frame point of view but how realistic or pragmatic is this?  Student-athletes will one day leave college and have professional careers (some even in professional sports).   Why would having the expectation of goods for performance not be a virtue?

When and How Did Colleges Lose Oversight of Athletics?

Originally, faculty were vested with the authority to control athletics and determine eligibility, however, scandals and negative coverage of college athletics created the need for more oversight of programs.  Although created in 1905 as an answer to regulating football, the NCAA had no real power to set the policy (and punish member institutions) for academic eligibility.  While there has always been impropriety in college athletics concerning eligibility that, in effect, is what has been the driver pushing the reform policies. 

The first documented college athletic scandal (Oriard, 2012) is of a rowing match between Harvard and Yale in 1896.  There was a protest by Yale over Harvard’s usage of a graduate student in athletic competition.  Despite protests, the student competed anyway and Harvard won the match.  From rowing competitions to eventually larger scandals in the 1950 regarding cheating and point shaving (West Point and the University of Kentucky, respectively) required colleges to explore their policies to codify institutional control over athletic programs. 

There is also the aspect of what college athletics does to change culture.  At the turn of the 20th century, 1-2% of Americans went to college (Oriard, 2012).  Athletics was a method to diversify and bring opportunity to groups of people that would otherwise not attend.  Sport was the method by which this was possible.  Oriard (2012) speaks to this dynamic suggesting that the changes in ethnic demographics of student athletes played into stereotypes of the dumb jock. 

“Football played a key role in democratizing American higher education, both actually and symbolically, as a predominantly WASP game celebrated in the nineteenth century for embodying the spirit of Anglo Saxon racial superiority began to be dominated by the sons of working of working class superiority began to be dominated by the sons of working class Irish, Italian, Polish, Slavic, and Jewish immigrants” (2012, p. 9)

             Some of the first questions concerning NCAA research centered on the question of freshman eligibility.  This question was raised from a policy perspective in reaction to scandals that in college athletics (Petr & McArdle, 2012).  The rationale was that by raising initial eligibility standards, it would bring integrity to major college sports (specifically, football and men’s basketball).  In 1983, Proposition 48 established NCAA eligibility standards for freshmen, however, it was not established based on empirical data.  The proposed reforms to take effect in the fall of 2016 is a commitment by university presidents to academic success by increasing eligibility standards based on quantitative research (Hosick & Sproull, 2012)   

Academic Research and Reform: A History of the Empirical Basis for NCAA Academic Policy (Petr & McArdle, 2012) explored factors that determine the success of incoming freshmen that are “initially eligible” (eligible for athletic competition upon matriculation at a NCAA member institution).  It was determined that high school core course grades better predict future academic success than standardized test scores.  What was also determined was that a combination of GPA from core courses (not extra-curricular) is a better predictor than either being used alone.  Petr and McArdle (2012) concluded that using GPA from a specific set of courses (core curriculum) is more accurate than utilizing overall GPA.

Paskus (2012) takes Petr and McArdle’s (2012) research further by analyzing the same data to determine outcomes of junior college transfers into four year institutions.  “We have learned that student-athlete transfers as a group are unlike two year transfers in the student body.  Only about one-third of two year transfers (Hackett & Sheridan, 2013) in the sports of football and men’s basketball met Division I IE [initial eligibility] standards coming out of high school”.  In other words, junior college transfers are already facing academic issues prior to being admitted into a four year institution.  Paskus’ (2012) analysis is what sets the new NCAA policy on academic eligibility effective in Fall 2016.  His research concludes that:

1.         By far the best predictor of student athlete success at the four year school is GPA at the two year school.  To succeed at the same rate as freshman non-transfers, the transfer must exhibit upwards of a 2.6 GPA at the two year school.

2.         GPA at the two year school are good predictors of four year college success to the extent they are not based on PE credits.  20% of two year transfers were transferring with twelve or more PE credits.

3.         Two year transfers who meet a minimum core curriculum at the two year school of six English, three math, and three science credits have ineligibility and failures that are half those of transfers who do not take such core academic classes.

The research is suggesting that GPA is a great indicator of academic success in college but standardized tests, give a clearer understanding.  

What is the Role of College Athletics?

The role of athletics on California’s community college campuses is an undefined gray area.  It is an ongoing debate in regards to limited resources and the broader mission of a higher education institution.  Leaders are balancing resources between athletic departments and the greater student body (in conjunction with the communities they serve).  In big time athletics, the revenue generation of programs can justify their existence but this is not the case in California’s 113 public community colleges.  As resources become more limited, educational leaders must question (and answer) the role of athletics in their institution.

Compliance and enforcement of policies is an essential component to athletics in community colleges.  College rules govern academic eligibility, ethics, and conduct of student athletes and programs.  There are incidents of egregious violations as in the case of the University of North Carolina or Penn State University which can be attributed to failures in leadership and enforcement.  There are also incidents in California community colleges that raise the question of compliance.  Bakersfield College had to vacate its 2012 state title for a myriad of California Community College Athletic Association (CCCAA) infractions.  Taft College eventually had to cut all of its athletic programs due to lawsuits, infractions, and lack of compliance (Evans, 2014).  No level of college athletics is immune from the ills of noncompliance or the lack of oversight.

The National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) has implemented reforms (effective Fall 2016) which community colleges must adhere to and adapt their policies to properly align.  Community college athletics directors and educational leaders must formulate rules and procedures to inform and support their student athletes to be eligible to transfer.  Under the new NCAA policy, community college transfers are required to have a 2.6 grade point average (GPA) in core courses and make sufficient progress towards a degree (15 core credits per semester) to be immediately eligible.  This policy change is supported by research (Paskus, 2012) stating that GPA is the most significant indicator in determining degree completion among student athletes transferring from community college to a four year institution.  The reforms on academic eligibility are historically significant because they are the first policy changes the NCAA has implemented that are supported by empirical research (Petr & McArdle, 2012).

Community college student athletes intending to participate in athletics fall into two categories as transfers to NCAA member institutions.  They are considered either Qualifiers or Non-Qualifiers.  Qualifiers are immediately eligible for athletic participation based on academic performance prior to full time higher education matriculation (i.e. high school).  They have already met the NCAA eligibility standards, which are based on GPA and SAT/ACT scores (sliding scale).  Non-Qualifiers are student athletes that do not meet academic eligibility requirements prior to higher education matriculation.  They are not eligible to immediately participate in NCAA Division I or II athletics (institutions that offer scholarships).  Non-Qualifiers attain NCAA initial eligibility status by graduating from a community college with an Associate of Arts (AA) or Associate of Science (AS) degree.

Previously, community college student athletes seeking to transfer to Division I or II institutions were required to successfully complete an average of 12 credits per full time semester with a 2.5 GPA (transferrable credits only).  The last semester prior to transfer, the transfer student was also required to have completed at least 6 credits.  Currently, a Qualifier is required to complete one full time semester while a Non-Qualifier is required to complete at least 3 full time semesters and attain an AA or AS degree (with at least 48 transferrable credits) prior to matriculation at an NCAA institution.

Under the new policy, Qualifiers and Non-Qualifiers are required to average 15 credits per full time semester.  The number of Physical Education (PE) classes that can transfer to NCAA member institutions has been limited to 2 credits.  Limiting PE classes prevents community college student athletes from augmenting their GPA by enrolling in “jock classes” to remain eligible for participation by requiring them to make progress towards a degree.  The biggest change in policy is the 2.6 GPA requirement in core classes (6 units in Math, 6 units in English, and 3 units in Science).  This GPA requirement is higher than the 2.3 GPA requirement for student athletes seeking athletic participation as Qualifiers out of high school and is the highest standard ever imposed on community college student athletes.  The NCAA reforms are requiring community colleges athletic programs to revisit policies, academic advising, and resources allocated to student athletes seeking to continue their athletic careers and, hopefully, attain an athletic scholarship.